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Banking Geography and Cross-Fertilization in the 
Productivity Growth of US Commercial Banks 
 
  Abstract 
 
The US banking industry offers a unique, natural and fertile environment to study geography‟s effects on 
banks‟ behavior and performance. The literature on banks‟ operating performance, while extensive, says 
little about the influence of spatial interactions on banks‟ performance. We compute and examine, using a 
physical distance-based spatio-temporal empirical model, the state-wide total factor productivity growth 
(TFPG) indices of US commercial banks for each state for the 1971-1995 period. We observe that the 
productivity growth of commercial banks in state i depends strongly, positively, and contemporaneously 
on the productivity growth of commercial banks located in state i‟s contiguous states. Further, “regulatory 
space” appears to induce frictions and lessen the documented spatial interactions. These findings support 
our plea that research on commercial banking sector‟s behavior need to pay a particular attention to the 




Banking Geography and Cross-Fertilization in the 
Productivity Growth of US Commercial Banks 
 
1. Introduction 
  The US banking industry offers a unique, natural and fertile environment to study geography‟s 
effects on banks‟ behavior and performance. Yet, a few research papers have recognized empirically, 
and only recently, geography‟s economic effects on banks‟ behavior and performance, leaving an open 
field for further investigation. This rather delayed recognition is surprising, given the presence of a huge 
volume of empirical literature on the measurement and policy implications of the productive efficiency of 
commercial  banks,  geography‟s  effects  on  the  market  structure  of  the  banking  industry  and  some 
observed  geographically-concentrated  patterns  in  the  banking  sector.
1  Meantime, regional scientists, 
urban and real estate economists, and economic ge ographers have long recognized the importance of 
geography, formulating distance-  (or space-)based models in their economic analyses. For example, 
Haynes and Fotheringham
2 (1984, pp. 10 and 11) note: 
  “Social scientists are interested in discovering fundamental and generalizable concepts that are 
basic to social relationships. One of the distinguishing aspects of human behavior is the ability to 
travel or move across the face of earth and to exchange information and goods over distance. 
Such exchange processes are referred to generically as interaction, and that which occurs over a 
distance occurs over space. Hence, the general term „spatial interaction‟ (emphasis added) has 
been developed to characterize this common type of geographic behavior. Shopping, migrating, 
commuting, distributing, collecting, vacationing, and communicating usually occur over some 
distance, and therefore are considered special forms of this common social behavior – spatial 
interaction. ... the farther places, people, or activities are apart, the less they interact (emphasis 
added).” 
Research  results  show  that  spatial  interactions  over  short-distances  cause  diffusion  (or 
contagion) of diseases (Cliff and Ord 1981), of innovations (Griliches 1957; Mandeville 1985), of asset 
prices (Garbade and Silber, 1978, 1979; Dubin, 1988; Clapp et al., 1990, 1995; Tirtiroglu and Clapp, 
1996;  Grinblatt  and  Keloharju,  2001;  Dolde  and  Tirtiroglu,  2002;  Loughran  and  Schultz,  2005; 
Christoffersen and Sarkissian, 2009; Uysal et al. 2008), of income (Haining, 1987), and of other similar 
processes. Close physical proximity among individuals or decision units in spatial models serves often as 
a proxy for more locally-relevant information with less noise. We endorse and subscribe to this viewpoint,
3 
                                                 
1A great majority of federal and especially state banking regulations in US was historically (until the passage of the Riegle-Neal 
Bank and Branch Efficiency Improvement Act of 1994, which was implemented in phases, beginning in 1995 and ending in 1997) 
formulated in relation to commercial banks‟ location, gradually shaping a geographically concentrated industry structure (Amel, 
1993; Kane, 1996). Restricting banks to operate only in a state, where they were chartered, might have deprived them of the 
benefits of diversifying their risks across the country, exposing the entire banking system, regulators and the federal deposit 
insurance administrators to face and deal with the ensuing bankruptcies (Kane, 1996; Berger and DeYoung, 2001). 
2 Helsley and Zenou (2011) formalize mathematically these and similar arguments for social networks with an explicit analysis of 
geographic location. 
3Communicating  may  occur  via  personal  (i.e.,  face -to-face)  or  impersonal  (i.e.,  telecommunications -based)  processes. 
Impersonal ones can cover a much la rger territory. For example, Garbade and Silver (1978) study how faster availability of 2 
 
which has a number of interesting implications for the market structure of local banking markets and the 
banking sector at large.
4 For example, the acquisition and processing of more information with less noise 
has the potential to contribute to the efficiency in fin ancial intermediation and to the social welfare of the 
market participants. Indeed, t he  intrastate  regulations  were  much  more  geographically-concentrated 
(such  as  at  the  county  level)  than  the  interstate  ones.
5  Their removal, during the wave of banking 
deregulations between 1970s and mid-1990s, led to a substantially better, faster and more direct effect 
on banks‟ performance and consumers‟ welfare than removal of the interstate banking regulations that 
occurred pretty much during the same time period (Jayaratne and Strahan (JS), 1998; Tirtiroglu et al., 
2005). A second example follows from Berger and DeYoung‟s (BD) (2001) conjecture that short distances 
between  clients  and  bank  branches  might  give  local  (and  mostly  community)  banks  a  comparative 
advantage in producing locally-relevant and important information for the so-called „relationship banking.‟ 
Last  but  not  the  least,  Geltner  and  Miller  (2001)  point  out  that  extensive  default  risk  inherent  in 
commercially-originated construction (mortgage) loans requires the lenders to have access to the locally-
relevant information about the surrounding real estate space market, local developers, and construction 
firms.  The  presence  of  extensive  systems  of  local  branches  gives  commercial  banks  and  thrifts 
comparative advantage over the large national and international lenders in developing local expertise. 
This, in turn, allows them to produce the majority of the construction loans, and equips them with a useful 
tool in asset-liability management.
6 
Furthermore, the conjecture that increased distance between/among states is a barrier to spatial 
interactions – and to the ensuing diffusion (i.e., cross-fertilization) processes – implies that there should 
be  regionally  (or  locally)  and  distinctly  observable  patterns  in  banks‟  performance.  Evidence  on  this 
                                                                                                                                                             
information, after the wider usage of telegram, would affect US Treasury bond prices. They note (p.820), “English investors had a 
substantial volume of US Treasury debt, and that debt traded in London as well as in New York. Prior to the opening of the cable 
participants in one market location received price information from the other center with a time delay equal to the duration of an 
ocean crossing, or about three weeks.” Certainly, the Internet has been playing a key role in storing and diffusing vast amounts 
of information in a cheap, fast and round-the-clock manner all over the world. 
4See Clapp et al. (1990), and Haining (1984) and Ning and Haining (2003) for geogr aphy‟s effects on the market structure of 
insurance agencies and gasoline stations, respectively.  
5The Illinois Banking Commission‟s “home office protection” prohibited a bank from opening a branch within a certain number of 
feet of another bank‟s main office until the early 1990's (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999). This is an example of legislatures‟ strict 
intrastate restrictions. Meanwhile, Tirtiroglu et al., (2005) find that the corporate control market under the regional reciprocity 
category was more effective in the short-run than that under both the national reciprocity and national non-reciprocity categories. 
This evidence from interstate deregulations also supports the importance of close proximity for banking markets. 
6A construction loan has a short-term maturity, is dispensed over time, and is not backed by an existing collateral commercial 
property, while a permanent financing loan has a long -term maturity, is dispensed typically all at once, and backed by a 
commercial property. The short-term nature of construction loans matches with the short-term nature of banks‟ deposit liabilities, 
and offers banks an asset-liability management tool. The long-term nature of permanent financing loans matches the long-term 
liabilities of life insurance companies and pension funds, and offers them, once again, an asset-liability management tool.  
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implication is reported, albeit indirectly, in a number of papers.
7 For example, return on assets for US 
commercial banks exhibit a regionally-distinct pattern
8 (BD, 2001). Also, the US commercial banks under 
the jurisdiction of the Third Federal Reserve District have noticeably less X -inefficiency than those under 
the jurisdiction of the remaining eleven Federal Reserve Districts (Mester, 1997). Further, DeLong (2001) 
shows that bank mergers based on geographic similarity enhance stockholder value considerably more 
than other types of mergers do (see also Cornett et al. 2006; Delong and DeYoung, 2007 for further 
evidence). Also, spatial patterns appear to be present in the production factors and commercial banks‟ 
output. For example, agriculture seems to be a dominant economic activity for many heartland states, 
potentially leading to a concentration and expertise in agriculture-based loans in the local commercial 
banks‟ loan production. Kane (1996) highlights the dangers of risks inherent in the underdiversified loan 
and deposit portfolios of such local commercial banks. Similarly, educational attainment of people, which 
might affect commercial banks‟ labor input and output level, seems to be varying in relation to geography. 
Perhaps the most obvious evidence for the regionally distinct patterns in bank behavior is the geographic 
concentration of the massive bank failures of late 1980s, early 1990s, and late 2000s.  
Hence, we call for (further) spatially-driven empirical approaches to the questions of interest in 
banking. Given the crucial role that commercial banks play in credit allocation, liquidity provision, and the 
implementation and transmission of monetary policy, understanding and documenting the nature and the 
reasons for geographical patterns in banks‟ behavior and performance is important not only for banks, 
their  clients,  and  policy-makers,  but  also  for  the  capital  markets.  Our  paper  makes  one  of  the  early 
attempts in pursuing a spatially-driven approach. We first estimate total productivity factor growth (TFPG) 
indices  at  the  state-level  for  each  US  state,  plus  the  District  of  Columbia  (DC),  and  then  develop  a 
spatially-driven novel empirical model to test for the hypothesis that adjacency of states is a determinant 
of the productivity growth of the banking sector in a given state. The basic underlying idea of our model is 
also  consistent  with  the  contagion  (or  spillover)  arguments  in  finance.  In  particular,  we  examine  the 
following  interrelated  questions,  which  –  to  our  knowledge  –  have  not  been  studied  in  the  banking 
literature so far: 
  (1) Is there a positive association between the state-wide TFPG estimates of banks in a state and 
the state-wide TFPG estimates of banks in this state‟s contiguous states?  
  (2) What is the “die-out duration” of the spatial diffusion process of TFPG?  
                                                 
7These findings are a by-product of research on non-geographic questions. Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest, without 
empirical evidence, that regional and seasonal influences along with differences in market location or operating environments, 
office size or even management style and organization, may be influential on commercial banks‟ operating performance. The first 
paper with an explicit focus on the geography‟s effects on banks‟ operating performance was BD‟s (2001) contribution. They use 
cost and profit efficiency estimates, at the bank level for 7,000 US banks from 1993 to 1998, to examine geographic expansion in 
the banking sector. Other relevant banking studies include Tirtiroglu et al. (2005) and Zhou (1997). 
8The correlation matrix for regional ROEs in BD (2001) supports the idea that distance between regions is a determinant of the 
correlation coefficients, and might be a source of diversification opportunities. 4 
 
  (3) If there is evidence of spatial interactions in banks‟ state-wide TFPG performance, is it an 
outcome of the regulatory space (i.e., similarity in the state-wide banking legislation) or physical distance?  
In addition, a comparison of the TFPG measurements by state, though not the main focus, also 
follows. 
In  regards  to  the  first  question,  we  first  note  that  TFPG,  which  measures  improvements  in 
productivity growth, is an amalgam of technical change and changes in efficiency (i.e., scale economies), 
and has been a commonly used indicator of the role of technology on input productivity. The literature 
attributes  any  positive  TFPG  findings  mainly  to  the  growth  in  technical  change.  This  is  because  the 
growth in the US banking industry was in the large regional and money center banks that, as identified in 
empirical studies, did not have much scale economies left to be realized in the 20
th century – see Daniels 
and Tirtiroglu (1998), who also use similar data, and the literature cited in this paper. A finding of positive 
association  in  banks‟  TFPG  estimates  between  a  subject  state  and  its  adjacent  neighboring  states 
provides evidence of spatial interactions over short(er)-distances, as does no or little association in banks‟ 
TFPG estimates between the subject state and its non-neighboring (and farther and farther away) states. 
Some  of  the  likely  agents  that  can  generate  this  “cross-fertilization”  of TFPG within  banking  markets 
include the social interactions during the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities, banks‟ recruitment of 
managerial talent with a strong enough reputation known within local labor markets, and /or urban sprawl 
and client movements. In general, these are factors that arise from face-to-face communication. 
The second question examines how long the spatial diffusion of TFPG lasts. Given that our data 
frequency is annual, if the spatial diffusion process of TFPG does not die off during its voyage across 
distances, it would be around for quite some time, reaching and affecting noticeably the non-neighboring 
states even after extended time periods. Our empirical models include up to three lags to examine the 
temporal life span of the spatial diffusion process.  
The  third  question  recognizes  that  similarities  and  differences  in  the  regulatory  space  of  the 
states may be a confounding factor, with respect to the first research question, in the spatial diffusion of 
TFPG over a distance. Our main concern here is on the state-wide interstate multibank holding company 
(IMBHC) banking (de)regulations. They took place in varying intensities and  at different times across 
states during our sample period. We remove potentially confounding effects of the state-wide interstate 
(de)regulations by constructing a sub-sample of states that declared the national non-reciprocity (NN) 
regime. These states offered an unconditional (i.e., no reciprocity) entry by any bank irrespective of where 
it  was  chartered  and  headquartered  within  the  USA.  Frictions,
9  imposed by  the protections of the 
regulations, might potentially reduce the intensity of the spatial diffusion of TFPG. This sub-sample is free 
from such frictions. So, spatial diffusion of productivity growth across contiguous states should be 
                                                 
9For  example,  Kane  (1996)  describes  a  frog-leaping  behavior,  such  that  some  states  allowed  their  banks  to  move  their 
headquarters only within a 30-35 miles radius, gradually leading to relocations in an adjacent state, over a defined period of time.  
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noticeably stronger for this sub-sample than that for the entire sample. Further empirical tests on the 
control sample of the remaining states – with conditionally eased regulatory space – offer comparative 
results.  
Our sample focuses on the 1971-1995 period and offers a natural experiment setting to study our 
questions. The Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 had prevented holding 
companies  from  acquiring  out-of-state  banks  unless  a  state  explicitly  permitted  such  acquisitions  by 
statute. The Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 has brought an end to these geographic restrictions. This period 
includes all state-wide interstate (de)regulatory evolutions from full restriction to partial, and then, to full 
removal of them. The FDIC makes state-wide data available starting with 1966. The data initialization 
requirements under the Kalman filter estimations move the sample-beginning year to 1971. Our sample 
period overlaps sufficiently with that of Berger and DeYoung (2006), who study empirically agency costs 
associated with geographic expansion of US banks between 1985 and 1998. BD (2006, p.1487) also note 
that the banks significantly increased their use of new information processing, telecommunications, and 
financial technologies over their sample period. 
The spirit of our investigation carries that of BD‟s (2001, 2006).
10 We differ, however, from their 
work in at least three main ways. First, we borrow more from the rich empirical literature on the spatio-
temporal models than BD (2001, 2006) do. Our approach allows for empirical tests based on regulatory 
space, as opposed to only distance-based space.
11 Space, wherein relevant data are generated, may be 
defined in a number of ways, depending on the research purposes; physical distance being only one of 
many possibilities in defining space. The sample period witnessed the state-level interstate deregulations 
in the form of  regional reciprocity (RR) or national reciprocity (NR), or national non-reciprocity (NN).
12 
Hence, regulatory space among the states was not homogenous during this period. We elaborate on the 
possible confounding effects and empirical implications of the regulatory space, and examine empirically 
whether interstate (de)regulations in the neighboring and non-neighboring states exerted any confounding 
effects on the empirical results. Second, the process of “learning-by-observing,” studied by DeLong and 
DeYoung (2007) for bank M&As, also has relevance for our paper. Learning-by-observing refers to, in 
their context, a temporal learning process from earlier M&A transactions. Meanwhile, spatial interactions 
(or cross-fertilization) are more general, and benefit from both temporal and spatial learning processes. 
                                                 
10 Deng and Elyasiani (2008) and DeYoung et al. (2008) also recognize distance in their works. 
11This distinction is likely to be important. Haynes and Fotheringham (1984) state, “Distances can be specified in these absolute 
terms. It is then possible to talk about one location being „five miles from New York City‟ and another being „five miles from 
Bloomington, Indiana.‟ In absolute terms these two locations are equal in that they are both five miles from an urban area. In 
relative terms, however, these locations are significantly different in a multitude of ways (for example in terms of access to 
shopping, access to job opportunities, access to museums, and theaters, access to rural life-styles, or access to wilderness 
opportunities.) Each of these significantly differentiates absolute location from relative location.” Furthermore, scale effects are 
important to recognize. For example, cities with large populations tend to generate and attract more activities than cities with 
small populations. See Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) for how the size of a city affects the mutual fund industry. 
12 We are not concerned about the confounding effects of the intrastate deregulations since we use state-level aggregated data. 6 
 
Third, the state of technology is latent and dynamic. The Kalman filter captures the latent and dynamic 
nature  of  the  technology  in  our  productivity  growth  estimates,  and  offers  us  the  flexibility  to  exclude 
variations of time-related indicator variables in our empirical approach (Slade 1989; Daniels and Tirtiroglu, 
1998). 
We  find  strong,  positive  and  contemporaneous  spatial  diffusion  of  banks‟  productivity  growth 
between a state and its contiguous states. This diffusion or cross-fertilization does not travel in time, dying 
off within a year. The empirical evidence also shows that removal of frictions, arising from the interstate 
multi-holding bank company regulations, nurtures considerably stronger spatial interactions among banks 
with close(r) proximity, and that regulatory space also matters for banks‟ productivity growth. Overall, 
these findings support our plea that new research on commercial banking sector‟s behavior need to pay a 
particular attention to the banking geography, and that policymakers recognize the implications of spatial 
interactions in formulating their policies for banks. 
  Section  2  spells  out  the  details  of  our  empirical  approach  and  data.  Section  3  reports  the 
empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper, and provides some thoughts for future research. 
 
2. Empirical Approach 
  We identify “state” as the geographic unit to examine the relation between banking geography 
and commercial banks‟ TFPG (Neely and Wheelock, 1997; JS, 1998; Kroszner and Strahan (KS), 1999; 
Tirtiroglu  et  al.,  2005;  and  Jeon  and  Miller  (JM),  2007),  and  use  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance 
Corporation‟s (FDIC) state-wide annual aggregated data, as explained in section 2.1, for 1966-1995 on 
commercial banks. In the present paper, our empirical approach is comprised of four steps: 
  (1) Computing state-wide annual unfiltered total factor productivity growth (UTFPG) indices of US 
commercial banks for 1967-1995 is the first step. This state-wide approach is consistent with Harrigan‟s 
(1997) criticism of the international trade economists for their assumption that TFPG for each industry is 
the same in every country (see also Corsetti et al, 2007). We study TFPG because: (a) currently, there is 
not any empirical evidence on the state-wide TFPG in banking, and the evidence on the banking sector‟s 
TFPG in US also is rather limited,
13 and (b) recent investment in technolog y in the commercial banking 
industry  has  been  vast  (in  billions  of  dollars)  and  increasing.  Thus,  understanding  the  nature  of 
technology and the role it plays in commercial banking is important in a time period when technology is a 
sizeable and growing part of business.
14 Appendix 1 reports the details of UTFPG index estimation.  
                                                 
13Humphrey  (1992)  stresses  the  need  for  more  empirical  evidence  on  TFPG  in  banking.  Existing  evidence  suggests  low 
productivity growth for the US commercial banks during the 20th century (See Humphrey, 1992, 1994; Bauer et al., 1993; Daniels 
and Tirtiroglu, 1998). 
14The Economist (Oct. 3, 1992, pp.21-24) reported that the investment in technology by US commercial banks went up from 
about $5.5 billion in 1982 to somewhere around $13 billion in 1991. Saunders (1994, p.79) points out that, prior to 1975, almost 
all transactions in the financial services sector were paper based.  
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(2) Slade (1989) warns that, a) when some input factors are not freely variable, shadow costs and 
market prices for these factors can differ, b) this kind of measurement error, in turn, leads to biases in 
UTFPG indices, and c) the bias will manifest itself in a pro-cyclical fashion (see also Sbordone, 1997). 
The shadow costs and market prices can further differ if the factor markets are not competitive. Absence 
of competitive factor markets, combined with quasi-fixed inputs, will lead to an exaggerated pro-cyclical 
bias. Evidence indicates that conditions such as the ones described here exist in US commercial banking, 
providing the grounds for pro-cyclical bias.
15 
Recent methodological advances, which employ the Kalman-filtering techniques (Kalman, 1960; 
Kalman and Bucy, 1961) to purge the pro-cyclical bias component from the stochastic trend component of 
the TFPG indices, enable us to portray a fairly reliable picture of the TFPG (Slade, 1989; Sbordone, 1997; 
Daniels and Tirtiroglu, 1998). We remove the pro -cyclical bias in the state -wide UTFPG indices and 
obtain the state-wide filtered total factor productivity growth (FTFPG) indices for 1971-1995.
16 Appendix 2 
reports the details of the Kalman filter application. 
(3) Next, we develop a spatio-temporal empirical model of commercial banks‟ productivity growth, 
following similar models implemented in the regional science and urban economics literature.
17 The basic 
underlying  idea  of  our  mod el  is  also  consistent  with  the  contagion/spillover  arguments  in  finance. 
Constructing a panel data set on the state-wide FTFPG yields a balanced fixed-effects model, which can 
test for whether the productivity growth of commercial banks in a given state exhibits any distance-based 
spatio-temporal  dependencies  with  the  productivity  growth  of  commercial  banks  in  (a)  the  adjacent 
neighboring  states,  and  (b)  randomly  chosen  non-neighboring  states.  Our  thinking  here  is  that  the 
existence of spatial interactions should manifest itself as a “cross-fertilization of productivity growth,” and 
particularly so, if and  when the states are contiguous. Section 2.1 offers the details of this empirical 
model. 
(4) Kane (1996) indicates that most states within  a given region have chosen similar IMBHC 
market entry restrictions. Thus, there is the possibility that any significant “cross-fertilization of productivity 
growth” from adjacent neighboring states to a given subject state (and vice versa) may be reflecting the 
effects  of  regulatory,  rather  than  distance-based,  spatio-temporal  dependencies.  To  control  for  this 
possibility,  we  construct  a  sub-sample  consisting  of  the  11  (out  of  the  total  of  13)  states,  whose 
legislatures chose the NN regime. Since states, which declare this regime, open their banking markets to 
all banks across the country both irrespective of their origin and without any reciprocity requirements, 
regulatory  space,  for  this  sub-sample,  can  be  ruled  out  as  an  explanation  for  any  spatio-temporal 
                                                 
15For example, Noulas et al. (1990) treat non-interest bearing deposits as a quasi-fixed input, while Hannan and Liang (1993) 
report evidence of lack of perfectly competitive bank deposit markets. Similarly, Humphrey (1992, 1994) recognizes that input 
prices may not reflect their shadow prices due to the extensive (de)regulations of the banking industry in the 20th century. 
16Data for the first few years are used up to initialize filtering. 
17See Clapp et al. (1995). 8 
 
interaction. We repeat our empirical contemporaneous test on this sub-sample and consider, further, the 
potential effects of the real US GNP growth, the real growth in the state-wide per capita income, the 
growth in the state-wide population, the state-wide population density, and the state-wide total number of 
branches. This extension seeks possible reasons for spatio-temporal interactions in banks‟ productivity 
growth. Section 2.3 lays out the arguments for this empirical step. 
 
2.1 Data 
  Our  data  set  consists  of  the  annual  state-by-state  data  on  insured  US  commercial  banks for 
1966-1995,  obtained  from  the  FDIC  Historical  Statistics  on  Banking,  1934-1995  database  (see 
www.fdic.gov).
18 FDIC aggregates annually commercial banks‟ data, from their call reports, at the national 
level  as  well  the  state  level.  The  state  level  data  show  the  annual  aggregates  for  the  variables  in 
commercial banks‟ call reports of all banks located in a given state and the number of bank branches. We 
use the state level data in this paper. This data set offers us a spatial distribution over 50 states (and also 
for  DC)  for  every  year  between  1966  and1995,  which  facilitates  the  identification  of  “state”  as  the 
geographic unit. 
Using commercial banking data defined at the state level is attractive for at least three reasons. 
First, JS (1998) document empirically that deregulations in the 1980s and 1990s enhance the natural 
tendency  of  markets  to  weed  out  inefficient  firms,  increasing  the  likelihood  of  the  selection  and 
survivorship problems that would bias tests based on data from individual banks. Second, using state-
level aggregates allows us to produce homogeneous estimates of the TFPG indices for the time period 
under consideration with data pertaining only to a given state. This means that the confounding effects of 
the performance of commercial banks of other states on the performance of a given state‟s commercial 
banks  are  controlled  for.  Third,  the  state-wide  data  allow  us  to  highlight  the  state-by-state  spatial 
differences in the operating performance of commercial banks. This is consistent with Mester‟s (1997) 
aforementioned finding of significant differences in US commercial banks‟ X-efficiency scores. 
Data  on  state-wide  population,  personal  income  and  per  capita  income  data  are  available  at 
http://govinfo.library.orst.edu/reis-stateis.html. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.doc.gov) also 
offers similar and useful data. Data on US real GNP are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/). 
 
2.2 Testing for Spatio-Temporal Productivity Growth Interactions
19 
The key argument of this paper is that, close(r) proximity among market participants (1) makes 
                                                 
18JS (1998), Tirtiroglu et al. (2005) and JM (2003, 2007) use commercial banking data aggregated at the state level. Others 
using state-wide data to study TFPG include Denny et al. (1981), Beeson (1987) and Domazlicky and Weber (1997). 
19See Clapp et al (1995) for a similar empirical model.  
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information transmission and sharing easier, faster, cheaper and more reliable (or less noisy) than distant 
proximity does, (2) allows for cross-fertilization among market participants, and, (3) leads to clustered 
bank performance within geographic space. DeLong and DeYoung (2007) and Uysal et al. (2008) show 
that locally-driven bank mergers enhance relevant information diffusion (see also Evanoff and Ors, 2008). 
Close proximity is also likely to endow regulators with pertinent information and precedence for regulatory 
measures  from  nearby  jurisdictions,  fostering  the  argument  for  geographically  clustered  bank 
performance. Another factor for performance clustering is the easier and faster transfer of managerial and 
technological know-how among nearby banks. Short(er) distances are likely to increase the mobility of 
human capital. Further, face-to-face interactions (for example, in the same country club or in churches or 
local  civic  organizations),  especially  among  bank  managers  and  other  relevant  parties,  should  also 
facilitate and foster such social network processes. Last factor, though not the least, are the client choices 
and actions. Clients open and close bank accounts and seek bank services in geographic space, as 
described  in  the  opening  quote  from  Haynes  and  Fotheringham  (1984).  Closing  a  bank  account  is 
abandonment option, and may be exercised for several reasons, including poor service of the current 
bank, better bank account deals offered by other banks, increased banking services through the Internet 
usage, or just sheer urban sprawl. Also, bank referrals from one customer to another, which is a common 
form of information transmission and experience sharing among individuals, also occur over a geographic 
space.
20 
This paper tests the hypothesis that bank performance clusters across space by regressing the 
productivity growth of commercial banks in state i at time t on the contemporaneous average productivity 
growth of commercial banks located in state i‟s (1) adjacent neighboring states and (2) randomly chosen 
non-neighboring states in the following fixed-effects model with a balanced panel data set: 
    
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where i, j, k and t refer to sample states, the number of (time) lags, the number of other explanatory 
variables, and each year of the sample period of 1971-1995; FTFPGi,t is the Kalman-filtered TFPG for 
state i at time t; SDi refers to cross sectional indicator variables for each state (excluding Alaska, Hawaii, 
and DC, since the first two are outside the realm of contiguous US states, while the last is not a state); 
TDt refers to time related indicator variables for each year for 1971-1995; AFTFPGng,t (AFTFPGnn,t) refers 
to the average Kalman-filtered TFPG for commercial banks in adjacent neighboring (randomly chosen 
non-neighboring) states at time t, respectively; ui,t refers to the regression error term; Xk,i,t is a ((48xt)x5) 
                                                 
20 We use state-level aggregated data. Under the conjecture of spatial interactions, bank managers are more likely to find and 
accept a new out-of-state job in a neighboring rather than non-neighboring state and, consequently, are more likely to transfer 
their banking expertise earned in their present state to the banking market of a neighboring state. Also, clients who may live in 
one state and work in another can foster the cross-fertilization process for local banking markets. . 10 
 
matrix with control variables of Popu Growth (annual state-wide population growth), Popu Density (annual 
state-wide population density), Income Growth (annual growth in state-wide real per capita income), and 
Branch No (annual state-wide total number of branches) for state i at time t. The number of randomly 
chosen non-neighboring states is the same as that of adjacent states for state i. 
Geographic clustering should yield a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate on 
the  contemporaneous  average  productivity  growth  of  commercial  banks  located  in  state  i‟s  adjacent 
neighboring states. Further, inclusion in the empirical models of time lags for the average productivity 
growth of commercial banks located in state i‟s adjacent neighboring states should capture the temporal 
spatial effects of geographic clustering. On the other hand, for the control sample of commercial banks in 
a set of non-neighboring states to be chosen at random for each subject state, the signs and significance 
of  the  coefficient  estimates  in  the  regression  are  not  predictable.  Random  selection  will  dictate  what 
states will make up the composition of the random sample of non-neighboring states. Overall, we expect 
the contemporaneous and temporal interactions for the control sample to be not significant. 
We  run  regressions  for  several  alternative  model  specifications.
21  Model 1 tests for only the 
contemporaneous  neighboring  and  non -neighboring  effects  with  j=0.  Models  2  through  4  test, 
respectively, for whether contemporaneous, lagged neighboring and lagged non -neighboring influences 
are present concurrently on a given state‟s productivity growth of commercial banks. Specifically, j=3 (=2, 
=1)  in  the  fourth  (third,  second)  model(s).  Models  5  through  8  replicate  Models  1  through  4,  while 
including  other  control  variables.  The  dependent  variable  is  a  vector  of  either  [48x25]  or  [48x24]  or 
[48x23]  or  [48x22]  observations.  To  avoid  perfect  collinearity,  we  drop  the  cross-sectional  indicator 
variable for Alabama and also the earliest time-related indicator variable (either 1971 or 1972 or 1973 or 
1974). Table 1 provides a list of neighboring and randomly chosen non-neighboring states for each state. 
- insert Table 1 about here - 
 
2.3 Controlling for the Effects of the State-wide IMBHC Regulations 
2.3.1 Background for the State-wide IMBHC Banking Regulations 
  The  Douglas  Amendment  to  the  Bank  Holding  Company  Act  of  1956  prevented  holding 
companies  from  acquiring  out-of-state  banks  unless  a  state  explicitly  permitted  such  acquisitions  by 
statute. Until 1978, no state allowed such provisions (Kane, 1996; JS, 1998; KS, 1999). The Riegle-Neal 
Act of 1994, as indicated in footnote 1, has brought an end for these geographic restrictions. Restrictions 
placed on geographic expansion make entry into or exit from a state‟s market and/or expansion within a 
state difficult, and hence, protect (especially the smaller and inefficient local) banks in this market from 
                                                 
21Hausman‟s  (1978)  test  results  indicate  that  data  do  not  fit  the  random  effects  model.  We  consider  other  fixed-effects 
specifications with no indicator variables or with indicator variables only for either states or time. These results are available from 
the authors upon request.  
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stiffer outside competition. As JS (1998, p.241) indicate, the banking “industry‟s efficiency may have been 
impaired  by  geographic  restrictions  because  they  vitiated  corporate  control  markets  by  reducing  the 
number  of  potential  acquirers,  thereby  worsening  agency  problems  between  bank  owners  and 
managers.”
22  
The first state to relax the IMBHC restrictions was Maine (in 1978). While all states (with the 
exception of Hawaii) and DC followed suit, each state nevertheless expressed its legislative choice for the 
degree (or intensity) of how much out-of-state competition to be permitted under its jurisdiction. A majority 
of states chose the RR regime, which represents the most restricted entry permission for the IMBHC 
expansion. Under this regime, state i determines the other states within its region whose banks it will 
grant conditional expansion opportunities in state i. The chosen states‟ banks can expand in state i only if 
their own states grant reciprocity to the banks of state i to expand in the chosen states‟ markets. Many 
other states, however, chose the NR regime. Under this regime, a state determined to grant conditional 
expansion opportunities to all remaining US states and DC. The NR choice is more liberal than the RR 
choice, but reciprocity by other states is still an entry condition. Finally, the NN regime allowed for the 
most intense (or the least restricted) form of out-of-state competition. A state granting this regime opened 
its market totally for the out-of-state competition to all banks in US without requiring any reciprocity. 
Amel  (1993)  classifies  the  states  according  to  their  regulatory  regime.  A  review  of  his  work 
reveals that, between January 1978 and September 1993, a total of 37 states declared initially RR (with 
seven and five other states declaring, NR or NN, respectively). Also, 17 of 37 RR states eventually moved 
to NR and six to NN later on, while two NR states moved eventually to NN during the same time period. 
As of 1993, there were 14 RR states, 22 NR states, and 14 NN states. Table 2 reveals some interesting 
patterns for these regulatory movements. 
- insert Table 2 about here - 
2.3.2 Empirical Implications of the National Non-Reciprocity IMBHC Regime 
  Prior to state i removing its market entry barriers in one form or another, the states invited by 
state i for reciprocity, in all likelihood, maintain similar protections and experience their consequences. 
For  the  most  part,  Amel‟s  (1993)  work  shows  that  the  states  invited  for  reciprocity  by  state  i  are 
neighboring states. Thus, what might appear in empirical results, as per eq.  [1], as a distance-based 
cross-fertilization relation may, in fact, be arising only as a result of the close(r) geographical proximity in 
the  regulatory  space  of  the  sample  states.  We  feel,  therefore,  it  is  useful  to  delineate  the  effect  of 
                                                 
22These regulations protected inefficient local commercial banks, and allowed them to avoid stiff competition from out-of-state 
banks or, alternatively, allowed them to face competition only from other local and like-minded inefficient banks (see Kane, 1996; 
KS, 1999; JS, 1996, 1998). Such protections increased these inefficient commercial banks‟ probability of survival, and kept them 
profitable. Meanwhile, bank performance improved significantly after restrictions were lifted, and operating costs and loan losses 
decreased sharply after states permitted statewide branching and interstate banking (JS, 1998). Other consistent evidence, for 
the entry of the de novo banks, is in DeYoung et al. (1998) and DeYoung and Hasan (1998). 12 
 
regulatory space from the effect of physical proximity.  
A sub-sample of NN states is valuable from an experimental design viewpoint.
23 The NN regime 
removes effectively all major restrictions imposed by the Douglas Amendment while the other two provide 
only partial and conditional removal of the entry restrictions. So, the market for corporate control under 
the NN regime should have been more effective than that under the RR or NR regimes. All NN states give 
any bank anywhere in the US the option to move  freely into any one or more of these states. In this 
context, if physical proximity and cross-fertilization between a sample state and its adjacent neighboring 
states were not a factor, then the coefficient estimates for AFTFPGng and AFTFPGnn in eq. [2] below 
should exhibit similar signs and statistical (in)significance levels. Thus, the differences in the signs and 
statistical significance levels of the coefficient estimates for AFTFPGng and AFTFPGnn will be crucial and 
reveal evidence for or against the contemporaneous physical-distance based spatial dependencies in 
commercial banks‟ productivity growth and behavior: 
  
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where µ and T refer to the beginning – which, as explained below, is different for each sample state – and 
ending  (i.e.,  1995)  years  for  the  time  indicator  variables. We  run  several  specifications  of  eq.  [2]  by 
introducing progressively various combinations of cross-sectional and temporal indicator variables in a 
fixed-effects setting. To avoid perfect collinearity, we drop the indicator variable for Arizona. 
DC and 13 states adopt this regulatory regime. We exclude Alaska, Oklahoma and DC from this 
sub-sample since Alaska is not in the continental US; DC is not a state; and Oklahoma assumes this 
regime under time-dependent conditions. This leaves a total of 11 states in this sub-sample. We use the 
data for a NN state only after this regime takes effect. Most of these 11 states have a different declaration 
date for their NN regime and are coded with an “NN” in Table 1. The resulting data set is unbalanced and 
restricts us to study only the contemporaneous spatial interactions: 
The remaining 37 states, either with the RR or the NR regime, constitute another sub-sample with 
an unbalanced panel data set. Empirical tests, similar to those for the sub-sample of 11 NN states, on this 
sub-sample  allow  us  to  obtain  comparative  results,  potentially  with  the  influence  of  both  spatial 
interactions as well as the regulatory restrictions. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Results for the Productivity Growth Indices and Patterns 
  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the state-wide TFPG estimates for US 
commercial banks are being reported in the literature. In Table 3, the means and standard deviations of 
                                                 
23Alternatively, one can construct a sub-sample of only either RR or NR states such that all the states in each sub-sample meet 
the reciprocity requirement. But neither deregulatory regime exerts as much competition as the NN regime does.  
13 
 
UTFPG and FTFPG indices are categorized by state and according to their geographical region. They 
illustrate that the state-wide FTFPG time paths have a stochastic trend that are centered about their 
means. Furthermore, each of the state-wide UTFPG and FTFPG indices share a common mean, but the 
volatilities of the state-wide UTFPG indices are much higher. Therefore, we use the state-wide FTFPG 
indices
24 in our further empirical tests as they are free from bias and/or pro-cyclical measurements. 
  - insert Table 3 here - 
  Table 3 results clearly 1) depict varied performance by region and states, 2) support our view that 
commercial banks‟ operating performance is related to where they are located, 3) are consistent with 
Harrigan‟s (1997), Mester‟s (1997), Neely and Wheelock‟s (1997) and Zhou‟s (1997) empirical findings,
25 
and 4) indicate low productivity growth for a good majority of the states during our sample period. The low 
productivity growth patterns are quite consistent with results reported in Humphrey (1992), Bauer et al. 
(1993), Boyd and Gertler (1993), Daniels and Tirtiroglu (1998). 
 
3.2 Full Sample Results for the Spatio-Temporal Model of Productivity Growth 
  Table 4 reports all empirical results from estimating eq. [1] on the full sample. The R-squared 
values indicate a good fit. 
  - insert Table 4 here - 
  Estimation results demonstrate a strong, positive and substantial amount of contemporaneous 
spatial dependency  of the productivity growth  of commercial banks located in state  i on the average 
productivity growth of commercial banks located in state i‟s adjacent neighboring states (i.e., AFTFPGng). 
There is no evidence in the results for the lagged spatial neighboring, contemporaneous spatial non-
neighboring or lagged spatial non-neighboring interactions. We interpret these results as strong and clear 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that banks‟ performance exhibits clustering over geographic space. 
These results also indicate that spatial interactions do not travel over time, and die off within a year.  
The estimates for AFTFPGng are significant at  least at the 1%  level in six models (Models 1 
through 6), and at the 5% level in two models. None of the estimates for variables for temporal spatial 
interactions  attain  statistical  significance  in  all  model  specifications.  Their  progressive  inclusions  in 
Models 2 through 4 boost the magnitude of the estimates for AFTFPGng from 0.46 in Model 1 to 0.71 in 
Model 4, but also change the associated t-statistics, without altering the significance level of 1%, from 
9.84 in Model 1 to 2.9 in Model 4. Introduction of other control variables exerts similar effects on the 
AFTFPGng estimates and their associated t-statistics in Models 5 through 8. All coefficient estimates of 
other control variables attain strong statistical significance – with the exception of that, at 10%, for Popu 
                                                 
24 The Dickey-Fuller test does not reject the stationarity of the state-wide FTFPG indices. 
25 Zhou (1997) documents that TFPG varied by geographic region with negative and positive performance, ranging from as high 
as 9.00% to as low as -8.00%. 14 
 
Dens in Model 5), and do not exhibit any sign reversals. Model 8 reports empirical results from the full 
model specification. The estimate of AFTFPGng is 0.58; significant at 5%. 
 
3.3 Results for the National Non-Reciprocity Sub-Sample 
Estimation results, as per eq. [2], in Table 5 for the NN IMBHC sub-sample confirm, again, a 
strong, positive and substantial amount of contemporaneous spatial interaction/cross-fertilization between 
the productivity growth of commercial banks in state i and AFTFPGng. These results are considerably 
stronger  than  their  counterparts  in  Table  4.  Meanwhile,  the  coefficient  estimates  AFTFPGnn  are  also 
relatively strong, large but negative.  
  - insert Table 5 about here - 
The states in this sub-sample eradicate their banking market entry restrictions. So, any bank 
anywhere in the US has the option to move freely to a given subject state‟s banking market. As indicated 
before, if spatial interactions due to close(r) proximity are not an important factor for banks‟ behavior, then 
the coefficient estimates for both AFTFPGng and AFTFPGnn should not be significantly different from zero. 
However, the coefficient estimates for both variables are statistically significantly different from zero in 
Table 5 and exhibit differences in signs, magnitudes and significance levels. We take these obvious sign 
differences  of  the  coefficient  estimates  for  both  variables  across  Table  5  as  strong  evidence  for  the 
presence of contemporaneous spatial interactions in commercial banks‟ productivity growth and behavior. 
Further, we also view these results as strong evidence that regulatory space induces frictions, and also 
matters  for  banks‟  performance  and  behavior.  Removal  of  these  frictions  enhances  and  fosters 
considerably the intensity of the spatial interactions over the US banking geography. 
  Model 1 through Model 4 exclude other control variables, and consider the differential effects of 
introducing state or time indicator variables. A comparison of the empirical results in Models 1 and 4 
indicates  clearly  that  controlling  for  these  fixed-effects  variables  boost  (dampen)  the  magnitude  and 
statistical significance of estimates for AFTFPGng (AFTFPGnn), respectively. In Model 4, the estimate for 
AFTFPGnn attains statistical significance only at the 10% level. Results in Model 5 through Model 8, with 
other control variables, are overall consistent with those in Model 1 through Model 4.  
Table 6 reports the empirical results for the sub-sample of states with the RR and NR IMBHC 
regimes. Results demonstrate, once again, the presence of strong, positive and substantial amount of 
contemporaneous spatial interactions between the productivity growth of commercial banks in state i and 
AFTFPGng. These results are considerably statistically stronger than their counterparts in Tables 4 and 5. 
Meanwhile,  the  coefficient  estimates  AFTFPGnn  are  also  strong,  large  and  –  interestingly  –  positive, 
differing completely from their counterparts, especially in Table 5 and confirming that regulatory space, 
too, matters and exerts its effects on the coefficient estimates in Tables 4 and 6. 
  - insert Table 6 about here -  
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The  RR  and  NR  states  do  not  eradicate  entirely  their  banking  market  entry  restrictions. 
Reciprocity  by  the  other  pertinent  states  remains  a  condition  for  the  entry  of  non-state  banks  into  a 
particular state‟s banking markets. Hence, empirical results from this sub-sample are likely to be injected 
with both the spatial diffusion of productivity growth and the regulatory protections. Once again, if spatial 
interactions are not an important factor for banks‟ behavior, then the coefficient estimates for AFTFPGng 
could  –and  should–  be  insignificant  from  estimations  on  this  sub-sample.  Further,  the  presence  of 
confounding regulatory effects should induce positive coefficient estimates for AFTFPGnn. 
The positive and significant coefficient estimates for AFTFPGng and AFTFPGnn offer further clear 
and strong evidence that banks engage in spatial interactions, and that regulatory space also matters in 
banks‟ productivity growth. The coefficient estimate for AFTFPGng (AFTFPGnn) ranges from 0.66 (0.28) 
with a t-statistics of 20.23 (8.07) in Model 1, having no controls for the time and state indicator variables, 
to 0.36 (0.17) with a t-statistic of 8.10 (2.62) in Model 4, having full controls for the time and state indicator 
variables,  respectively.  These  results  suggest  that  the  force  of  spatial  interactions  among  banks  is 
stronger than that of regulatory space. Results in Model 5 through Model 8 are, overall, consistent with 
those in Model 1 through Model 4.  
 
4. Summary, Conclusions and Further Thoughts 
  This paper first provides estimates of annual state-wide total factor productivity growth indices of 
US  commercial  banks.  An  examination  of  these  indices  reveals,  (1)  non-homogeneity  (i.e.,  visible 
differences in the magnitudes and/or dynamics) of commercial banks‟ productivity growth over space, 
which is consistent with Harrigan (1997) (see also Zhou, 1997),
26 and (2) low productivity growth across 
time  and  space.  These  findings,  in  our  view,  reflect  the  influence  of  banking  geography  on  the 
performance of US commercial banks. 
Next, we develop a spatio-temporal empirical model to test for whether proximity plays a role in 
the cross-fertilization of productivity growth to a given state from its contiguous states (and vice versa). 
The empirical results from this model are consistent with both physical proximity‟s effects on productivity 
growth as well as regulatory space‟s effects on productivity growth. To control for whether the empirical 
results are driven by regulatory space rather than physical-distances among the states, we construct a 
sub-sample of states which had opened up their banking markets to competition from all out-of-state 
banks anywhere in US by declaring the national non-reciprocity regime. All estimation results indicate that 
                                                 
26Zhou (1997) finds that TFPG is generally negative in most large metropolitan areas, but that the performance changes as the 
firm characteristics change. For example, most metropolitan unit banks tend to have higher TFPG than the metropolitan branch 
banks. Zhou‟s (1997) findings also suggest that, after controlling for the (1) the same branching regime, the northern commercial 
banks have lower TFPG than the southern commercial banks, and (2) metropolitan location, western commercial banks have 
higher TFPG than the northern commercial banks. Zhou (1997) attributes the differences in TFPG to regional commercial 
banking characteristics such as the branching regime, bank holding company affiliation, and regional location. 16 
 
the  physical  proximity  of  states  to  one  another  has  a  strong  contemporaneous  influence  on  US 
commercial banks‟ productivity growth for 1971-1995. Further empirical tests on the control sample of the 
remaining states – with conditionally eased regulatory space – demonstrate that interstate regulations, in 
addition  to  the  physical  proximity,  were  also  feeding  the  process  of  cross-fertilization  of  banks‟ 
productivity growth. 
These  results  clearly  highlight  the  importance  and  significance  of  banking  geography  on  US 
commercial banks‟ operating performance. An understanding of the nature of, the reasons for, and the 
consequences  of  the  spatially-driven  similarities  and  differences  in  commercial  banks‟  operating 
performance  should  be  an  important  public  policy  objective.  Furthermore,  our  findings  suggest  that 
neglecting banking geography in empirical modeling may result, inadvertently and implicitly, in the omitted 
variable problem in modeling bank behavior, and that empirical findings may miss the true nature of the 
relations between commercial banks‟ behavior and some other relevant (and perhaps crucial) factors. We 
feel that future research, which will capture geographic variations, can provide new and important insights 
into the commercial banks‟ behavior and the intensity of competition in this sector. This, in turn, should 
lead to better and more informed public policies and decisions, and also improvements in the quality of 
empirical measurements. 
There are indeed quite interesting  empirical applications of the spatio-temporal modeling. For 
example, Haining (1984) shows that the intensity of competition and the dynamics of gasoline prices are 
a function of how closely the gas stations in a local market area are located to one another. The firm 
behavior observed in road intersections with many gas stations differs considerably from the firm behavior 
observed for gas stations, which are separated by a few miles with no other gas station in between. In 
another interesting paper, Dubin (1988) considers the impact of physical distance between residential 
properties on their prices, and reports a rather significant relation between distance and pricing.
27 The 
finance literature, cited in our introduction, has demonstrated recently the strength and importance of the 
geography for investment patterns and performance, mutual fund flows, and M&As. 
These and other studies in the urban economics and the economic geography literature, and 
increasingly in financial economics, can easily, richly and fruitfully be adapted to many aspects of the 
commercial banking issues, as exemplified in BD (2001, 2006) and Deng and Elyasiani (2008), and data. 
We are convinced that spatially -designed approaches will provi de new and important insights for the 
commercial banks‟ behavior, and the intensity of competition in this sector, leading to more informed 
public policy. We are currently tackling some of these important issues in our ongoing work. 
 
                                                 
27 For recent spatial modeling applications in real estate prices and further relevant literature, see Bogdon and Can (1997), and 
Pavlov (2000, 2001).  
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Table 1: Adjacent Neighboring and Randomly Assigned Non-Neighboring States for Each State 
This  table  shows  for  each  state  its  adjacent  neighboring  and  randomly  assigned  non-neighboring  states.  The 
averages of the Kalman-filtered productivity growths in the neighboring and the randomly assigned non-neighboring 
states are used in the spatio-temporal model for empirical tests in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Alaska and Hawaii do not have 
neighboring states, and DC is not a state. They are excluded. The states, which had declared their choice for the 
national non-reciprocity IMBHC regime (Amel, 1993), are coded with an (NN) next to them. This regime removes the 
interstate barriers for entry into a state‟s banking markets without imposing any reciprocity from other states. The data 
for these states are used in producing the results in Table 5. While Alaska and DC had declared the NN regime, they 
are excluded in producing the results in Table 5. 
 
States  Neighboring States  Non-neighboring States 
Alabama  Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Tennessee  Oregon, Washington, Kansas, Missouri 
Arizona(NN)  California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico,Utah 
Alabama, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts,  
West Virginia 
Arkansas 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, Texas 
Connecticut, Wisconsin, Arizona, Wyoming, 
Minnesota, Iowa 
California  Arizona, Nevada, Oregon  Michigan, Delaware, Kentucky 
Colorado(NN) 
Arizona, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Utah, Wyoming 
Nevada, Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, South 
Carolina, Georgia, Illinois 
Connecticut  New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island  California, Ohio, South Carolina 
Delaware  Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania  Georgia, Utah, Illinois 
Florida  Alabama, Georgia  Pennsylvania, Tennessee 
Georgia  Alabama, Florida, South Carolina, Tennessee  Mississippi, Delaware, California, New York  
Idaho(NN) 
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, 
Wyoming 
Maryland, Indiana, Rhoda Island, New 
Mexico, California, North Dakota 
Illinois  Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Wisconsin 
Texas, Maine, Alabama, Tennessee, 
Michigan 
Indiana  Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio  Wisconsin, Florida, Iowa, Mississippi 
Iowa 
Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, South Dakota, 
Missouri, Wisconsin 
Maine, Kansas, Oregon, West Virginia, Idaho, 
Vermont 
Kansas  Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma  Maryland, Kentucky, Iowa, Alabama 
Kentucky 
Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee, 
Virginia, West Virginia 
Oklahoma, Minnesota, Delaware, Texas, 
North Carolina, Florida, Arkansas 
Louisiana  Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas  Missouri, North Carolina, Utah 
Maine(NN)  New Hampshire, Massachusetts  Wyoming, Montana 
Maryland  Delaware, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia  Iowa, Connecticut, Tennessee, Minnesota 
Massachusetts 
Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, New 
York, Rhode Island, Vermont 
Arkansas, Florida, California, Iowa, New 
Jersey, Utah 
Michigan  Indiana, Ohio, Wisconsin  Minnesota, Arizona, California 
Minnesota  Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin  Colorado, Utah, Massachusetts, Delaware 
Mississippi  Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, 
Rhoda Island, Kentucky, Vermont, New 
Mexico 
Missouri 
Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucy, 
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Tennessee 
Georgia, Wisconsin, Maine, New Jersey, New 
York, Delaware, North Carolina, Vermont 
Montana  Idaho, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming  Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire, Arizona 
Nebraska 
Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, South 
Dakota, Wyoming 
Florida, Rhode Island, Tennessee, New 
Jersey, Idaho, Maine  
Nevada(NN)  Arizona, California, Idaho, Oregon, Utah 
Colorado, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, 
Maryland, Vermont 
New 
Hampshire(NN)  Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts  Wisconsin, Louisiana, Arizona 18 
 
New Jersey  New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware  Mississippi, Indiana, Nebraska 
New Mexico(NN)  Arizona, Utah, Colorado, Oklahoma, Texas 
Florida, South Dakota, Oregon, Michigan, 
Idaho 
New York 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey 
New Mexico, Rhode Island, Illinois,  
Kentucky, Maryland 
North Carolina  Virginia, Tennessee, South Carolina  Iowa, Maryland, West Virginia 
North Dakota  South Dakota, Minnesota, Montana  Kansas, Michigan, Iowa 
Ohio 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, 
Kentucky, Indiana 
Arizona, Virginia, Alabama, New Jersey, 
Oregon 
Oklahoma 
Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New 
Mexico, Texas 
Virginia, Delaware, Kentucky, Nebraska, 
Wisconsin, North Carolina 
Oregon(NN)  Washington, Idaho, California, Nevada  Kansas, Illinois, Missouri, Rhode Island 
Pennsylvania 
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, 
West Virginia, Ohio 
Indiana, Kansas, Colorado, Massachusetts, 
Arkansas, Montana 
Rhode Island  Massachusetts, Connecticut  Iowa, California 
South Carolina  North Carolina, Georgia  Alabama, Nebraska 
South Dakota 
North Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, 
Wyoming, Montana 
New Mexico, Illinois, Utah, North Carolina, 
Oregon, New Jersey 
Tennessee 
Kentucky, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, 
Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Missouri 
Minnesota, Wyoming, Indiana, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, New York, Delaware, Maine 
Texas(NN)  Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico  Illinois, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Florida 
Utah(NN) 
Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, 
Arizona, Nevada 
Connecticut, Iowa, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Kansas, Montana 
Vermont   New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York  Wisconsin, Idaho, Virginia 
Virginia 
West Virginia, Maryland, North carolina, 
Tennessee, Kentucky 
South Carolina, Delaware, Pennsylvania, 
New Hampshire, Michigan 
Washington  Idaho, Oregon  New Hampshire, California 
West Virginia 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, 
Ohio 
New Mexico, Connecticut, Florida, Utah, 
South Carolina 
Wisconsin  Michigan, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota  Nevada, Delaware, Arizona, Rhode Island 
Wyoming(NN) 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, South 
Dakota, Utah 








Table 2: Evolution of the state-wide IMBHC regulatory movements. 
 
This table shows the transitions and evolution of the IMBHC regulatory regimes between 1978 and 1993. Oklahoma declared NN on July 1, 1987, conditional 
on a four-year delay, imposing this regime to take effect on and after July 1, 1991. Oregon was the only state with the regional non-reciprocity regime. 
 
 
a) The distribution of the state level IMBHC regulations as of September 1993: 
 
Regulatory Regime    No. of States 
Regional Reciprocity    14 
National Reciprocity    22 
National Non-reciprocity    14 
No Transitions Yet    1 
Total    51 (including the District of Columbia) 
 
 
b) The distribution of the transitions of state level IMBHC regulatory regime until September 1993. 
 
Transition  Initial No.  No. of States 
  of States  Remaining (Sep. 1993) 
Initial Transition to Regional Reciprocity  37      14 
Initial Transition to Regional Non-reciprocity  1      0 
Initial Transition to National Reciprocity  7      5 
Initial Transition to National Non-reciprocity  5      5 
No Transitions Yet  1      1 
 
From Regional Reciprocity to National Reciprocity        17 
From Regional Reciprocity to National Non-reciprocity        6 
From Regional Non-reciprocity to National Non-reciprocity        1 




Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Total Factor Productivity Growth Rates by State, 1971-1995 
This table provides the means and standard deviations of the state-wide unfiltered and filtered total factor productivity growth (UTFPG and FTFPG) indices. The UTFPG indices 
are estimated using the Tornqvist index for 1967-1995. The FTFPG indices are obtained via Kalman filtering on the UTFPG indices. The FTFPG indices are for the 1971-1995 
(1967-1971 are initial values for the Kalman filter). We deflate all nominal variables by the GNP deflator with 1987 set at 100. 
 























FTFPG  Region/State    Region/State    Region/State 
North East     West North Central    Mountain 
Connecticut  0.22  6.43  0.22  1.7    Iowa  0.87  4.13  0.87  1.69    New Mexico  1.14  4.64  1.16  1.49 
Maine  1.57  6.33  1.57  2.63    Kansas  0.93  4.39  0.91  1.55    Arizona  -0.14  7.24  -0.14  2.06 
Massachusetts  2.61  8.57  2.62  2.28    Minnesota  1.16  5.05  1.16  1.24    Utah  0.96  5.04  0.97  1.4 
N. Hampshire  2  5.23  2  1.94    Missouri  1.38  5.21  1.38  2.01    Nevada  -0.96  8.06  -0.89  1.29 
Rhode Island  1.14  7.35  1.14  1.2    Nebraska  1.12  4.26  1.11  2.04    Colorado  0.99  5.74  0.99  3.24 
Vermont  1.81  4.49  1.81  1.11                         
Mid-Atlantic     South Atlantic-1    Pacific States 
New York  1.45  10  1.45  0.47    Delaware  2.04  7.05  2.04  2.28    Washington  1.29  4.44  1.29  1.2 
New Jersey  2.13  5.62  2.15  1.5    Maryland  2.07  6.44  2.08  1.1    Oregon  0.91  7.24  0.9  3.32 
Pennsylvania  1.57  5.05  1.58  1.32    Virginia  1.78  4.77  1.78  1.53    California   -1.02  7.19  -1.02  1.2 
            W. Virginia  1.7  5.2  1.68  2.88             
East North Central    South Atlantic-2    Mountain-West North Central 
Indiana  1.63  4.93  1.63  2.18    Florida  2.35  5.63  2.35  2.01    N. Dakota  1.04  4.06  1.05  1.75 
Illinois  0.72  6.15  0.72  1.55    Georgia  2.13  5.26  2.13  4.41    S. Dakota  1.25  5.07  1.17  0.64 
Michigan  1.34  5.69  1.34  2.95    N. Carolina  3.22  6.19  3.23  2.46    Montana  0.9  5.26  0.91  2.5 
Ohio  1.67  4.5  1.67  1.45    S. Carolina  1.99  5.34  2.01  0.88    Idaho  1.72  5.79  1.72  2.19 
Wisconsin  1.25  4.83  1.25  2.15                Wyoming  2  6.14  2  4.23 
East South Central    West South Central    Other States and regions 
Alabama  1.05  4.6  1.05  1.69    Arkansas  1.43  4.32  1.43  2.09    Alaska  1.86  6.12  1.86  0.71 
Kentucky  1.36  4.49  1.36  1.4    Louisiana  1.12  3.98  0.99  1.4    Hawaii  -2.16  5.14  -2.15  2.11 
Mississippi  1.93  4.68  1.94  1.31    Oklahoma  0.73  3.72  0.73  1.33    D.C.  -0.82  7.81  -0.83  0.28 




Table 4: Results from the spatio-temporal model for the full sample 
The results reported below come from the following spatio-temporal empirical model: 
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where i, j, k and t refer to sample states, the number of (time) lags, the number of other explanatory variables, and 
each year of the sample period of 1971-1995; FTFPGi,t is the Kalman-filtered total factor productivity growth for state i 
at time t; SDi refers to cross sectional indicator variables for each state (excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and DC); TDt 
refers  to  time  related  indicator  variables  for  each  sample  year;  AFTFPGng,t  (AFTFPGnn,t)  refers  to  the  average 
Kalman-filtered total factor productivity growth for commercial banks in adjacent neighboring (randomly chosen non-
neighboring) states at time t, respectively; Xk,i,t is a [(48xt)x5] matrix with variables of Popu Growth (annual state-wide 
population growth), Popu Density (annual state-wide population density), Income Growth (annual growth in state-wide 
real per capita income), and Branch No (annual state-wide total number of branches) and ui,t refers to the regression 
error term. We stack the data, run several fixed-effects models and do not report the coefficient estimates for cross-
sectional and time indicator variables. Model 1 tests for only the contemporaneous neighboring and non-neighboring 
effects (j=0). Models 2 through 4 test, respectively, for whether contemporaneous, lagged neighboring and lagged 
non-neighboring  influences  are  present  concurrently  on  a  given  state‟s  commercial  banks‟  productivity  growth. 
Specifically, j=3 (=2, =1) in the fourth (third, second) model(s). After including control variables, Models 5 through 8 
replicate Models 1 through 4. The dependent variable is comprised of a vector of either [48x25] or [48x24] or [48x23] 
or [48x22] observations. See Table 1 for a list of neighboring and randomly chosen non-neighboring states. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 1  Model 2  Model 2  Model 3  Model 3  Model 4  Model 4 
  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat 
Intercept  0.15  0.45  0.01  0.03  -0.34  -0.91  -0.62  -1.61 
AFTFPGng  0.46  9.84***  0.42  3.16***  0.69  3.02***  0.71  2.90*** 
AFTFPGnn  -0.06  -1.01  0.21  1.04  -0.21  -0.60  -0.35  -0.94 
AFTFPGL1ng  n/a  n/a  0.03  0.28  -0.54  -1.30  -0.46  -0.90 
AFTFPGL2ng  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.33  1.45  0.14  0.28 
AFTFPGL3ng  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.09  0.37 
AFTFPGL1nn  n/a  n/a  -0.33  -1.49  0.58  0.88  0.73  0.92 
AFTFPGL2nn  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  -0.55  -1.49  -0.46  -0.58 
AFTFPGL3nn  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  -0.17  -0.45 
Pop Grw  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Pop Dens  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Branch No  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Inco Grw  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Time Indic  Yes  n/a  Yes  n/a  Yes  n/a  Yes  n/a 
State Indic  Yes  n/a  Yes  n/a  Yes  n/a  Yes  n/a 
N  1200    1152    1104    1056   
R-squ  0.64    0.66    0.67    0.68   
 22 
 
Table 4 Cont‟d  
 
Variable  Model 5  Model 5  Model 6  Model 6  Model 7  Model 7  Model 8  Model 8 
  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat 
Intercept  0.75  1.69*  0.70  1.48  0.32  0.63  0.35  0.70 
AFTFPGng  0.39  8.09***  0.37  2.82***  0.57  2.51**  0.58  2.42** 
AFTFPGnn  -0.043  -0.70  0.23  1.13  -0.16  -0.45  -0.30  -082 
AFTFPGL1ng  n/a  n/a  -0.0006  -0.00  -0.43  -1.05  -0.37  -0.75 
AFTFPGL2ng  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.24  1.10  0.11  0.22 
AFTFPGL3ng  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.06  0.28 
AFTFPGL1nn  n/a  n/a  -0.32  -1.49  0.48  0.74  0.68  0.88 
AFTFPGL2nn  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  -0.48  -1.32  -0.51  -0.66 
AFTFPGL3nn  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  -0.08  -0.22 
Pop Grw  0.39  2.79***  0.47  3.38***  0.53  3.79***  0.58  4.05*** 
Pop Dens  -4.71  -1.87*  -6.90  -2.74***  -8.47  -3.33***  -9.69  -3.73*** 
Branch No  -0.003  -3.70***  -0.003  -3.89***  -0.003  -3.89***  -0.003  -3.84*** 
Inco Grw  6.57  4.28***  6.35  4.15***  6.80  3.73***  5.48  3.11*** 
Time Indic  Yes  n/a  Yes  n/a  Yes  n/a  Yes  n/a 
State Indic  Yes  n/a  Yes  n/a  Yes  n/a  Yes  n/a 
N  1200    1152    1104    1056   





Table 5: Results from the spatio-temporal model for the sub-sample of national non-reciprocity states. 
The results below come from a spatio-temporal model, which uses data for 11 states with the national non-reciprocity 
(NN) IMBHC regime:  
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where i, k, and t refer to 11 sample states with the national reciprocity regime, the number of other explanatory 
variables, and the number of (time) lags, and each year of the sample period 1971-1995; FTFPGi,t is to the Kalman-
filtered total factor productivity growth for state i at time t; SDi refers to cross sectional indicator variables for each 
state in this sub-sample; TDt refers to time related indicator variables for each sample year; AFTFPGng,t (AFTFPGnn,t) 
refers to the average Kalman-filtered total factor productivity growth for commercial banks in adjacent neighboring 
(randomly chosen non-neighboring) states at time t, respectively; Xk,i,t is a [(11xt)x5] matrix with variables of Popu 
Growth (annual state-wide population growth), Popu Density (annual state-wide population density), Income Growth 
(annual growth in state-wide real per capita income), and Branch No (annual state-wide total number of branches) 
and ui,t refers to the regression error term. We stack the data beyond the declaration date of the NN regime by a 
given  state  and  generate  an  unbalanced  panel  data  set.  The  dependent  variable  represents  11  states  and  is 
comprised of a vector of 83 observations. We run several regressions and do not report the coefficient estimates for 
cross-sectional  and  time  indicator  variables.  Table  1  provides  a  list  of  neighboring  and  randomly  chosen  non-
neighboring states for the sub-sample of states with the NN regime, coded NN. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 1  Model 2  Model 2  Model 3  Model 3  Model 4  Model 4 
  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat 
Intercept  2.04  2.12**  1.72  1.35  1.71  3.89***  0.94  1.83* 
AFTFPGng  1.05  4.81***  1.05  4.08***  1.34  11.56***  1.59  10.20*** 
AFTFPGnn  -0.66  -3.39***  -0.56  -1.99**  -0.47  -6.03***  -0.20  -1.67* 
Pop Grw  N/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Pop Dens  N/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Branch No  N/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Inco Grw  N/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Time Indic  No  n/a  Yes  Insig  No  n/a  Yes  Some sig 
State Indic  No  n/a  No  n/a  Yes  All sig  Yes  9/10 sig 
N  83    83    83    83   
R-squ  0.339    0.349    0.934    0.944   
 
Variable  Model 5  Model 5  Model 6  Model 6  Model 7  Model 7  Model 8  Model 8 
  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat 
Intercept  5.58  3.82***  5.99  3.38***  6.82  3.23***  5.54  1.22 
AFTFPGng  0.97  4.78***  0.86  3.65***  1.41  9.65***  1.42  7.91*** 
AFTFPGnn  -0.85  -4.33***  -1.00  -3.31***  -0.42  -4.54***  -0.35  -2.08** 
Pop Grw  -58.02  -4.51***  -64.04  -4.58***  11.25  1.30  11.88  1.26 
Pop Dens  -16.61  -1.85*  -18.61  -1.97*  -172.28  -2.52**  -140.56  -1.02 
Branch No  0.0001  0.16  0.0001  0.18  0.0005  0.44  0.001  0.44 
Inco Grw  -20.39  -1.49  -24.39  -1.55  -2.28  -0.44  -3.07  -0.51 
Time Indic  No  n/a  Yes  Insig  No  n/a  Yes  None 
State Indic  No  n/a  No  n/a  Yes  7/10 sig  Yes  4/10 sig 
N  83    83    83    83   




Table 6: Results from the spatio-temporal model for the sub-sample of regional and national reciprocity 
states. 
The results reported below come from the following spatio-temporal empirical model: 
  
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where i, j, k and t refer to 37 sample states with the regional or national reciprocity regime, the number of (time) lags, 
the number of other explanatory variables, and each year of the sample period of 1971-1995; FTFPGi,t is the Kalman-
filtered total factor productivity growth for state i at time t; SDi refers to cross sectional indicator variables for each 
sample state (excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and DC); TDt refers to time related indicator variables for each sample year; 
AFTFPGng,t (AFTFPGnn,t) refers to the average Kalman-filtered total factor productivity growth for commercial banks in 
adjacent neighboring (randomly chosen non-neighboring) states at time t, respectively; Xk,i,t is a [(37xt)x5] matrix with 
variables  of  Popu  Growth  (annual  state-wide  population  growth),  Popu  Density  (annual  state-wide  population 
density), Income Growth (annual growth in state-wide real per capita income), and Branch No (annual state-wide total 
number of branches) and ui,t refers to the regression error term. We stack the data to build an unbalanced dataset 
with  1,117  observations,  run  several  fixed-effects  models  and  do  not  report  the  coefficient  estimates  for  cross-
sectional and time indicator variables. See Table 1 for a list of neighboring and randomly chosen non-neighboring 
states. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 1  Model 2  Model 2  Model 3  Model 3  Model 4  Model 4 
  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat 
Intercept  0.10  2.01**  0.457  2.14**  -0.403  -1.68*  0.168  0.54 
AFTFPGng  0.66  20.23***  0.544  12.65***  0.492  14.11***  0.359  8.10*** 
AFTFPGnn  0.28  8.07***  0.098  1.72*  0.433  11.71***  0.171  2.62*** 
Pop Grw  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Pop Dens  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Branch No  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Incogrw  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Time Indic  No  n/a  Yes  13/24 sig  No  n/a  Yes  19/24 sig 
State Indic  No  n/a  No  n/a  Yes  26/47 sig  Yes  25/47 sig 
N  1117    1117    1117    1117   
R-squ  0.571    0.577    0.677    0.684   
 
Variable  Model 5  Model 5  Model 6  Model 6  Model 7  Model 7  Model 8  Model 8 
  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat  Estimate  t-stat 
Intercept  -0.88  -0.68  0.01  0.05  0.56  1.54  1.12  2.73*** 
AFTFPGng  0.62  18.63***  0.49  11.28***  0.43  11.79***  0.26  5.82*** 
AFTFPGnn  0.34  9.32***  0.14  2.42**  0.49  12.42***  0.19  2.95*** 
Pop Grw  0.17  1.67*  0.18  1.77*  0.32  2.62***  0.40  3.22*** 
Pop Dens  0.48  2.55**  0.44  2.36**  -2.31  -1.07  -3.96  -1.77* 
Branch No  -0.001  -3.63  -0.0005  -3.19***  -0.003  -5.27***  -0.004  -5.41*** 
Inco Grw  3.00  2.51**  7.34  4.69***  2.37  2.11**  6.31  4.57*** 
Time Indic  No  n/a  Yes  17/24 sig  No  n/a  Yes  21/24 sig 
State Indic  No  n/a  No  n/a  Yes  25/47 sig  Yes  30/47 sig 
N  1117    1117    1117    1117   




Appendix 1: Measurement and Computation of the TFPG 
We follow a two-step procedure, identical to that used in Daniels and Tirtiroglu (1998). The first 
step employs the Tornqvist (1936) index to compute UTFPG indices for each sample year and for each 
state  and  DC,  while  the  second  step  separates  UTFPG  into  its  stochastic  trend  and  pro-cyclical 
components. The Tornqvist (1936) index computation for UTFPG indices is as follows: 
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where i = Alabama, ..., Wyoming, including DC; ln Oi,t is the natural log of output for state i at time t; csn,i,t 
is the respective input cost share for state i, at time t, defined as the cost of the respective input divided 
by total cost; ln In,i,t is the natural log of each input quantity for state i, at time t; and N is the number of 
inputs, respectively (to simplify notation, we suppress i, unless explicitly needed).  
Following Humphrey (1992), and Daniels and Tirtiroglu (1998), we construct a model with a single 
output  and  three  factors  of  production  in  defining  the  variables  to  estimate  UTFPG.  Our  variable 
definitions follow from Humphrey's (1992) real balance measure (in Humphrey‟s notation, it is QD). The 
single output, denoted by O, is the real dollar value of deposit and loan balances. Labor (W), capital (K), 
and loanable funds (F) are the inputs. We use a single output to keep our work simple. Existing literature 
shows  that  US  commercial  banks‟  productivity  growth  has  been  low  and  that  the  measurement  of 
productivity  growth  does  not  differ  under  a  multiple  output  or  a  single  output  specification.  All  these 
variables  are  stock measurements  since  our  data  do  not  allow  us  to  implement  flow  measurements. 
Humphrey  (1992,  1994)  establishes  that  there  is  not  much  difference  in  the  predictive  accuracy  of 
aggregate  productivity  based  on  stock  or  flow  measurements.  Table  A1.1  lists  the  definition  of  each 
variable. 
- insert Table A1.1 about here - 
  Eq. (A1) computes UTFPG with data from two consecutive years. So, 1967 is the earliest year for 
a UTFPG estimate. We deflate the data by the GNP deflator using 1987 as the base year. Table A1.2 
provides the summary statistics for the variables in eq. (A1). All variables are measured at year end. 
- insert Table A1.2 about here - 
  Our production model omits a growing aspect of bank production, namely, the off-balance sheet 
activities,  which  now  generate  a  substantial  portion  of  bank  income.  We  note,  however,  that  our 
productivity growth indices are for the period of 1971-1995, during which the off-balance sheet activities 
were  not  as  much  prominent  as  they  are  now.  In  fact,  Humphrey‟s  (1992)  work  support  that  our 




Appendix 2: A State-Space Model of TFPG 
  Following Slade (1989), Daniels and Tirtiroglu (1998) use a latent variable approach to purge the 
pro-cyclical bias from the true or filtered TFPG. This is achieved by modeling the FTFPG as a stochastic 
trend, and the measurement error as the residual bias. State-space techniques are a natural method of 
handling latent variables. The latent variable is the stochastic trend component of the UTFPG index: 
UTFPG(t) = FTFPG(t) + e(t)  (A2.a) 
FTFPG(t) = FTFPG(t-1) + w(t)  (A2.b) 
where UTFPG(t) is the unfiltered index of TFPG; FTFPG(t) is the filtered TFPG modeled as a stochastic 
trend; e(t) is the measurement error of the UTFPG index; w(t) is the white-noise error term for FTFPG(t) 
with mean and variance (0,
2
w). Equations (A2a,b) are estimated by maximum-likelihood techniques, 
using the Kalman filter. Eq. (A2.a) is the observation equation, and eq. (A2.b) is the transition equation. In 
our analysis, the conditional distribution of UTFPG(t) is normal with the following mean and likelihood 
functions:
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  (A4) 
where  Log  L  is  maximized  with  respect  to  the  parameters  µ  (the  FTFPG(t)),  Σ  (a  (NxN)  covariance 
matrix), Φ, and B (the covariance of the residuals from the observation equation) . Initializing the Kalman 
filter  estimations  require  data  for  1967-1970  for  each  state,  reducing  the  time  period  for  the  FTFPG 
estimates from 1967-1995 to 1971-1995. 
 
                                                 
28 See Daniels and Tirtiroglu (1998) for more details of the estimation procedure. The results of the maximum likelihood 
estimations are available from the authors upon request.  
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Table A1: Definition of Variables 
This table provides the variable definitions used in computing the state-wide TFPG indices. We follow 
Humphrey (1992, 1994) and Daniels and Tirtiroglu (1998) in defining these variables. The state-wide data 
are  from  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (http://www.fdic.gov).  We  deflate  all  nominal 
variables by the GNP deflator with 1987 set at 100.  
 
                                                                                                         
 
  1.  output (Y) – the real value of deposit and loan balances 
 
  2.  cost (C) -- the real value of sum of expenses on physical capital, labor and 
      total interest on loanable funds 
 
  3.  price of labor (W)  –  the real value of total wages and salaries divided by the 
      number of employees 
 
  4.  price of physical capital (K) – the real value of physical capital expenses 
      such as expenses on furniture, equipment, and bank premises 
      (including depreciation) divided by the book value of net bank 
      premises, furniture, equipment and fixture 
 
  5.  price of funds (F) – {the real value of interest paid on domestic checking and 
      savings deposits} plus {the real value of interest paid on time 
      deposits, subordinated notes and debentures, and other borrowed 
      money} plus {the expense of acquiring federal funds and funds 
      under repurchase agreements} divided by {the sum of loanable 
      funds from each of these sources}. 
 















Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for Tornqvist Index by State, 1971-1995 
 
This table provides the summary statistics for the FDIC‟s state-wide data. These data are used in the 
Tornqvist index to estimate the state-wide unfiltered total factor productivity growth indices between 1967 
and 1995. Total Cost, Deposits and Loans are a percentage of the total assets; Labor Shr is the labor 
share of total cost; Funds Shr is the funds share of total cost; Capital‟s share in total costs can be found 
by subtracting the sum of labor‟s share and fund‟s share from one; and W is the real wage, K is the real 
capital cost and F is the price of funds. 
   Total Cost  Labor Shr.  Funds Shr.  Deposits  Loans  W  K  F 
   Mean  Std.  Mean  Std.  Mean  Std  Mean  Std  Mean  Std  Mean  Std.  Mean  Std.  Mean  Std. 
North East 
Connecticut  7.46%  1.55%  24%  6%  51%  10%  82%  5%  59%  4%  $26,569   $4,803   $121   $33   4.20%  1.54% 
Maine  7.87%  1.47%  22%  4%  52%  8%  84%  4%  63%  4%  $21,619   $3,016   $120   $24   4.55%  1.43% 
Massachusetts  8.96%  2.25%  21%  6%  58%  10%  76%  3%  56%  5%  $27,701   $5,076   $133   $23   5.74%  2.18% 
New 
Hampshire  8.30%  1.79%  18%  6%  53%  9%  85%  4%  66%  6%  $22,263   $3,480   $152   $62   4.84%  1.53% 
Rhode Island  8.39%  1.78%  20%  5%  59%  9%  78%  5%  64%  4%  $27,250   $5,404   $136   $46   4.93%  1.64% 
Vermont  7.82%  1.48%  21%  3%  57%  7%  89%  2%  70%  5%  $21,877   $3,192   $109   $34   4.86%  1.41% 
Mid-Atlantic  
New York  8.23%  2.20%  18%  6%  65%  10%  72%  5%  56%  4%  $37,232   $8,691   $133   $49   5.88%  2.19% 
New Jersey  6.91%  1.42%  21%  4%  55%  8%  85%  2%  57%  6%  $24,307   $4,001   $111   $26   4.15%  1.34% 
Pennsylvania  7.24%  1.57%  19%  4%  62%  9%  78%  3%  58%  4%  $24,948   $2,129   $124   $27   4.90%  1.63% 
East North Central 
Indiana  7.14%  1.61%  19%  4%  61%  8%  83%  2%  55%  6%  $21,872   $1,419   $110   $34   4.81%  1.63% 
Illinois  7.42%  1.87%  18%  5%  65%  10%  79%  3%  55%  2%  $28,274   $3,643   $99   $24   5.32%  1.97% 
Michigan  7.35%  1.63%  19%  3%  61%  7%  83%  4%  58%  4%  $24,323   $2,647   $110   $17   4.88%  1.58% 
Ohio  7.27%  1.60%  19%  3%  58%  8%  79%  4%  58%  7%  $22,841   $2,136   $127   $25   4.68%  1.54% 
Wisconsin  7.27%  1.52%  19%  3%  60%  7%  84%  2%  59%  4%  $23,614   $2,186   $90   $15   4.81%  1.47% 
West North Central 
Iowa  7.03%  1.64%  19%  4%  62%  8%  86%  2%  51%  2%  $24,003   $1,887   $118   $37   4.87%  1.68% 
Missouri  6.80%  1.64%  20%  4%  59%  8%  82%  2%  52%  5%  $22,049   $1,601   $114   $52   4.48%  1.60% 
Nebraska  7.38%  1.73%  21%  4%  56%  8%  86%  2%  54%  4%  $24,036   $1,220   $131   $39   4.58%  1.61% 
Minnesota  7.24%  1.65%  18%  4%  61%  10%  79%  4%  57%  4%  $26,581   $3,615   $136   $29   4.85%  1.73% 
Kansas  7.00%  1.68%  21%  4%  59%  8%  86%  1%  50%  3%  $23,394   $1,740   $87   $24   4.66%  1.68% 
South Atlantic-1 
Delaware  8.21%  1.92%  18%  9%  54%  12%  61%  17%  64%  16%  $25,481   $3,273   $285   $181   4.93%  1.63% 
Maryland  7.21%  1.62%  24%  5%  53%  8%  81%  4%  60%  5%  $22,310   $3,886   $118   $31   4.28%  1.51% 
Virginia  7.67%  1.50%  21%  3%  57%  8%  82%  4%  61%  4%  $22,511   $3,474   $95   $29   4.64%  1.47% 
West Virginia  6.85%  1.64%  18%  3%  61%  7%  85%  2%  51%  5%  $20,309   $1,007   $76   $19   4.72%  1.59% 
South Atlantic-2 
South Carolina  7.29%  1.52%  26%  7%  48%  10%  80%  5%  56%  7%  $21,126   $2,271   104  $30   3.92%  1.44% 
Georgia  7.54%  1.38%  23%  4%  52%  7%  77%  4%  58%  5%  $23,834   $2,449   $97   $12   4.34%  1.33% 
Florida  7.13%  1.60%  20%  3%  53%  7%  85%  2%  53%  8%  $21,641   $2,902   $98   $31   4.16%  1.40% 
North Carolina  7.32%  1.47%  22%  4%  58%  8%  76%  7%  56%  5%  $23,323   $3,879   $101   $34   4.63%  1.54%  
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East South Central 
Alabama  7.19%  1.62%  22%  4%  57%  7%  82%  3%  55%  6%  $21,303   $1,787   $95   $26   4.60%  1.58% 
Mississippi  7.18%  1.72%  22%  5%  57%  9%  86%  2%  52%  2%  $21,597   $1,795   $87   $31   4.58%  1.73% 
Kentucky  6.84%  1.66%  20%  4%  59%  8%  82%  3%  55%  5%  $21,490   $2,089   $106   $33   4.53%  1.66% 
Tennessee  7.42%  1.68%  21%  3%  57%  7%  84%  2%  56%  4%  $22,882   $2,973   $93   $16   4.71%  1.58% 
West South Central 
Arkansas  6.96%  1.66%  21%  4%  58%  8%  87%  1%  52%  3%  $21,078   $1,691   $93   $31   4.48%  1.65% 
Louisiana  7.26%  1.77%  21%  4%  56%  9%  86%  2%  51%  2%  $22,543   $2,128   $91   $43   4.48%  1.62% 
Oklahoma  7.19%  2.08%  21%  4%  58%  8%  86%  1%  50%  3%  $23,573   $2,093   $95   $33   4.59%  1.65% 
Texas  7.04%  1.67%  18%  5%  59%  11%  82%  2%  51%  4%  $24,243   $2,497   $84   $24   4.59%  1.71% 
Mountain 
Colorado  7.77%  1.60%  23%  4%  48%  8%  84%  3%  55%  4%  $24,140   $2,477   $121   $34   4.11%  1.43% 
New Mexico  7.51%  1.68%  22%  4%  55%  8%  86%  3%  54%  2%  $20,557   $1,733   $88   $35   4.58%  1.62% 
Arizona  7.67%  1.59%  24%  4%  52%  8%  83%  5%  64%  4%  $24,525   $3,376   $87   $17   4.37%  1.46% 
Utah  7.68%  1.64%  20%  4%  55%  8%  81%  5%  60%  4%  $21,016   $2,719   $115   $32   4.59%  1.51% 
Nevada  7.90%  1.83%  21%  6%  48%  10%  73%  16%  62%  9%  $23,427   $2,846   $145   $87   4.09%  1.41% 
Mountain-West North Central 
North Dakota  7.05%  1.64%  20%  4%  62%  7%  88%  1%  52%  4%  $24,527   $2,135   $107   $37   4.82%  1.62% 
South Dakota  9.49%  3.22%  14%  6%  54%  14%  70%  19%  68%  10%  $23,447   $2,535   $317   $216   5.28%  1.77% 
Montana  7.27%  1.61%  20%  4%  57%  8%  87%  2%  54%  5%  $23,318   $1,947   $108   $28   4.60%  1.58% 
Idaho  7.50%  1.78%  21%  5%  57%  7%  83%  5%  62%  5%  $21,266   $1,508   $111   $25   4.68%  1.65% 
Wyoming  6.96%  1.75%  20%  2%  57%  6%  87%  3%  50%  5%  $23,424   $1,712   $96   $23   4.43%  1.51% 
Pacific States 
Washington  7.89%  1.77%  24%  4%  52%  9%  81%  2%  66%  7%  $26,253   $2,807   $88   $20   4.51%  1.66% 
Oregon  7.36%  1.57%  25%  5%  53%  10%  80%  3%  61%  6%  $23,536   $2,793   $92   $13   4.28%  1.56% 
California  7.94%  1.83%  22%  5%  57%  11%  82%  1%  64%  6%  $28,688   $4,829   $101   $23   4.92%  1.85% 
Other States and regions 
Alaska  7.37%  1.48%  29%  6%  46%  8%  81%  5%  52%  6%  $29,269   $2,342   $73   $24   4.11%  1.39% 
Hawaii  7.36%  1.45%  24%  5%  56%  7%  84%  7%  60%  3%  $25,593   $3,847   $84   $19   4.49%  1.42% 
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